Attention please! by Gossner, Olivier et al.
  
 
 
 
Working Paper No. 308 
 
 
Attention Please! 
 
 
 
 
 
Olivier Gossner, Jakub Steiner and Colin Stewart 
 
 
 
November 2018 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
University of Zurich 
 
Department of Economics 
 
 
 
Working Paper Series 
  
ISSN 1664-7041 (print) 
 ISSN 1664-705X (online) 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Attention Please!∗
Olivier Gossner
CREST, CNRS, E´cole Polytechnique
and London School of Economics
Jakub Steiner
University of Zurich and CERGE-EI
Colin Stewart
University of Toronto
November 29, 2018
Abstract
We study the impact of manipulating the attention of a decision-maker who learns sequen-
tially about a number of items before making a choice. Under natural assumptions on the
decision-maker’s strategy, forcing attention toward one item increases its likelihood of being
chosen.
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1 Introduction
The struggle for attention is a pervasive phenomenon. Its importance has been documented in the
context of advertising at least since Fogg-Meade (1901). More broadly, attention-seeking behavior
plays an important role in marketing, finance, industrial organization, psychology, and biology.1
The main message is consistent across fields: drawing attention toward an item increases its demand.
The existing literature provides two main explanations for how attention-grabbing advertising
and marketing influence demand. One is that they directly affect preferences. While difficult
to disprove, a theory of changing preferences offers limited predictive power and makes welfare
analysis challenging. The other major explanation is that advertising conveys information—either
directly or through signaling—and thereby changes beliefs. But this second channel alone does not
∗We benefited from comments of Ian Krajbich, Arina Nikandrova, Marco Ottaviani, and audiences in Vancouver,
Evanston, Cergy, and Bern. Pavel Ilinov, Jan Sedek, and Jiaqi Zou provided excellent research assistance. This work
was financially supported by the French National Research Agency (ANR), “Investissements d’Avenir” (ANR-11-
IDEX0003/LabEx Ecodec/ANR-11-LABX-0047) (Gossner), ERC grant 770652 (Steiner), and by the Social Sciences
and Humanities Research Council of Canada (Stewart).
1See, e.g., Lou (2014) for finance, Eliaz and Spiegler (2011) for industrial organization, Orquin and Loose (2013)
for psychology, and Dukas (2002) for biology.
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suffice to explain the empirical evidence. In fact, there is a sizable body of evidence showing that
manipulating attention has a direct influence on demand even when devoid of information.2
We identify a mechanism through which grabbing attention increases demand without influenc-
ing preferences or conveying information. In our model, a decision-maker learns sequentially about
the quality of a number of items by dynamically switching attention among them before making
a choice. Paying attention to an item generates a noisy signal about its value. Due to cognitive
limitations, the decision-maker can focus only on one item at a time; while she pays attention to
a given item, her belief about its value evolves stochastically, while her beliefs about the other
items remain the same. Starting from a given strategy governing the decision-maker’s attention,
we introduce an attention-grabbing manipulation that forces the decision-maker to focus on one
“target” item for a fixed duration. We show that, under general conditions, such a manipulation
increases demand for the target item.
For the most part, we focus on a setting with binary values, in which each item is either good
or bad; we extend our results to allow for more than two values in Section 5.3 The decision-maker
can choose one of the items or an outside option of known value that she prefers to a bad item but
not to a good one. We impose a simple stopping rule: the decision-maker ceases to learn about an
item once she is sufficiently certain of its value. If she believes an item is sufficiently likely to be
good, she stops learning and chooses that item. If she believes an item is sufficiently likely to be
bad, she continues to learn about the other items until she finds one that is likely to be good or
determines that all items are likely to be bad (in which case she chooses the outside option).
The decision-maker’s learning is governed by an attention strategy that maps beliefs in any given
time period to a (possibly random) item of focus. An attention strategy generates, for each profile
of values of the items, a stochastic process over beliefs and items of attention, and a probability that
each item is chosen. We refer to these probabilities as interim demands for the items. The impact
of attention manipulation is captured by the difference in interim demands under the baseline and
manipulated attention strategies, where the baseline strategy is the one the decision-maker employs
in the absence of manipulation, while the manipulated strategy forces the decision-maker to focus
on a target item for a fixed duration, after which she returns to her baseline strategy.
We show that manipulation of attention increases demand and decreases the time to decision in
favor of the target item. Also, when the manipulated strategy leads to the choice of an item other
than the target, it takes longer to do so than does the baseline strategy. These results hold for any
realization of the items’ values. In particular, forced attention increases demand even if the target
item is bad.
The key to understanding the effect of manipulation is to consider the path of learning for each
possible realization of the sequence of signals for each item. Given such a realization, we can view
an attention strategy as selecting, in each period, an item for which to uncover one more step along
the sequence. The choice of item at the end of the process can be thought of as resulting from a kind
2See, e.g., Chandon et al. (2009), Krajbich and Rangel (2011), or, for a survey, Orquin and Loose (2013).
3Binary-value models are common in the literature on sequential sampling; see, e.g., Wald (1945) or, for more
recent work, Che and Mierendorff (2017) and Morris and Strack (2017).
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of approval contest: the decision-maker continues to learn until she approves of one of the items,
or until she finds all of them to be unworthy of approval. For a given realization of signals, there
may be multiple items the decision-maker would approve of were she to pay enough attention to
them. The choice then comes down to which of these items she approves of first. Forcing attention
toward one of these items accelerates the process of approval for this item while slowing it down
for the other items. Consequently, the likelihood that the target item is chosen increases.
This simple intuition ignores the significant complication that manipulating attention generally
affects future attention choice. It could happen, then, that manipulation toward a target item leads
to a path along which the decision-maker pays much less attention to the target item afterwards,
more than compensating for the direct effect of increased attention. If there are only two items (not
including the outside option), then this cannot happen: our results hold regardless of the baseline
attention strategy. With more than two items, we require two additional assumptions. First, the
attention strategy should be stationary: focus in each period must depend only on the current
beliefs, not on the current time. The second assumption is a form of independence of irrelevant
alternatives (IIA): conditional on not focusing on an item i, the probability of focusing on each
other item is independent of the belief about the value of item i (though it may depend on the
beliefs about items other than i). Together, these two assumptions allow us to consider learning
about the target item separately from learning among the remaining items, effectively reducing the
problem to one with two items.
To formalize these intuitions, we rely on a technique known in probability theory as coupling .
In short, we construct a joint probability space in which we fix, for each item, the outcome of the
learning process that would arise if the decision-maker focused only on that item. We refer to a
profile of realizations of these learning processes across items as a draw. We show that, for every
draw, forced attention toward an item both increases demand for that item and decreases decision
time.
Both stationarity and IIA are needed for our results in the sense that their conclusions do
not hold if we dispense with either assumption; we provide counterexamples in Section 4. Both
assumptions, though restrictive, are automatically satisfied if the attention strategy is optimized
given the stopping rules in our model: we prove that strategies that minimize a general class of
expected attention costs have a (stationary) Gittins index structure as in the theory of multi-armed
bandits. It follows that these strategies are stationary and satisfy IIA.
The presence of an outside option plays an important role in our analysis. Without it, the
decision-maker could choose by a process of elimination rather than approval; that is, she could
seek to eliminate items that she believes to be bad and ultimately choose an item—the last one
remaining—with little knowledge of its value. In this case, manipulating attention toward an item
may increase the chance that it is eliminated before the other items, thereby decreasing the demand
for it.
When each item can take on more than two values, the presence of an outside option is no longer
sufficient to generate our results. For example, with two items, it could be that the decision-maker
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is confident both are better than the outside option, making the problem effectively the same as
one with no outside option. However, our results go through as long as the decision-maker stops
and chooses an item only when her belief about that item falls within a given set. We think of
this set as consisting of those beliefs at which the decision-maker is sufficiently certain about the
item’s value. Requiring a degree of certainty about the chosen item is natural if its value affects
subsequent decisions. In the binary values case, then, the key role played by the outside option is
that it makes the decision-maker choose an item only when she is confident that it is good.
Our result is robust to many aspects of the learning process. The information structure for each
item is general, allowing for any number of signal realizations and dependence on the current belief
about the item. The decision-maker need not be Bayesian; we can, for instance, reinterpret her
beliefs as intensities of accumulated neural stimuli in favor of each item, which can evolve according
to an arbitrary stationary Markov process (not necessarily corresponding to Bayesian updating).
We also allow for attention strategies that are not optimal, making our results robust with respect
to the structure of the attention costs if these strategies were chosen optimally.
Related literature Evidence that increased attention boosts demand comes from several fields.
In marketing, Chandon et al. (2009) show that drawing attention to products—for instance, with
large displays or placement at eye level—increases demand. In finance, Seasholes and Wu (2007)
show that attention-grabbing events about individual stocks increase demand for them. In biology,
Yorzinski et al. (2013) study the display strategies through which peacocks grab and retain the
attention of peahens during courtship.
When applied to advertising, our approach finds support in Fogg-Meade (1901) who notes that
“successful advertisement is obtrusive. It continually forces itself upon the attention.” Bagwell
(2007) surveys the economics literature on advertising and divides it according to whether adver-
tisements are treated as persuasive or informative. In the persuasive approach, advertising directly
influences customers’ preferences. In the informative approach, advertisements inform consumers
about product availability, prices, or characteristics. Relative to these approaches, we show how
advertising can boost demand with stable preferences even when advertisements convey no infor-
mation.
Our assumptions on attention allocation are rooted in psychology. Though humans are able to
pay attention to multiple stimuli simultaneously, such division of attention is difficult, especially
when the stimuli are similar to each other (e.g., Spelke, Hirst, and Neisser, 1976). Psychologists
distinguish between exogenous and endogenous attention, where the first is beyond the decision-
maker’s control and is triggered by sudden movements, bright colors and such, while endogenous
attention shifts are controlled by the decision-maker (Mayer et al., 2004). We can interpret attention
allocation during our manipulation window as being exogenous, whereas our baseline attention
strategy fits the endogenous attention interpretation.
Our model builds on a long tradition in statistics and economic theory originating in Wald
(1945), who proposed a theory of optimal sequential learning about a single binary state. A grow-
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ing literature studies optimal sequential learning about several options when attention must focus
on one item at a time (Mandelbaum, Shepp, and Vanderbei, 1990; Ke, Shen, and Villas-Boas, 2016;
Ke and Villas-Boas, 2017; Nikandrova and Pancs, 2018; Austen-Smith and Martinelli, 2018). The
structure of the optimal learning strategy varies depending on the costs and information struc-
ture. Our results on the impact of attention manipulation are independent of these considerations;
however, relative to this literature, we make simplifying assumptions on the rules that govern ter-
mination of learning. In a different vein, Che and Mierendorff (2017) study sequential allocation
of attention between two Poisson signals about a binary state. In contrast, in our model, the
decision-maker chooses among signals about multiple independent states.
In the drift-diffusion model of Ratcliff (1978), a decision-maker accumulates an internal signal
based on the difference in the values of two actions, making a choice when the signal becomes
sufficiently strong.4 Krajbich, Armel, and Rangel (2010) explicitly incorporate attention choice in
this model, and introduce an exogenous bias in the accumulated signal toward the item on which the
decision-maker is currently focusing. This extended drift-diffusion model accommodates empirical
findings showing that exogenous shifts in attention tend to bias choice (see, e.g., Armel, Beaumel,
and Rangel, 2008; Milosavljevic et al., 2012). Relative to this literature, whose primary modeling
goal is to fit choice data, we focus on foundations for the mechanism by which attention affects
demand.
Optimal sequential learning about several items is related to the theory of multi-armed bandits
(Gittins and Jones, 1974). We exploit this connection to show that optimal attention strategies
satisfy IIA by using the Gittins index characterization.
2 Main result in a simple setting
In this section, we show in the simplest possible setting that a temporary forced attention to an
item increases the probability that the decision-maker (DM) chooses it.
The DM chooses one among two items i ∈ {1, 2} of unknown values vi ∈ {0, 1} or an outside
option with a known value z ∈ (0, 1). The two values vi are independent ex ante, and each is equal
to 1 with prior probability pi0. The DM learns sequentially about each item, and can vary the focus
of her learning as specified below. She chooses when to stop learning, at which point she selects an
item or the outside option based on whichever one has the highest posterior expected value.
Let pit denote the DM’s belief about each item i at the beginning of the period t and write pt
for the pair of beliefs (p1t , p
2
t ). At the beginning of each period t = 0, 1, . . ., the DM chooses an
item ιt on which to focus in period t. She receives a signal that is informative about the value of
item ιt and independent of the value of the other item. In this section, the signal takes on values
0 and 1, and for each v, Pr(xt = v
ιt | vιt = v) = λ and Pr(xt = 1− vιt | vιt = v) = 1− λ for some
λ > 1/2. Upon observing a signal realization, the DM updates her belief according to Bayes’ rule.
4When the signal is interpreted as a belief and the stopping rule is optimized, Ratcliff’s model is essentially
equivalent to a sequential sampling model in the style of Wald (1945).
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In particular, the DM’s belief about the item she is focusing on changes while her belief about the
other item remains fixed. Thus, letting
p[+] =
λp
λp+ (1− λ)(1− p) (1)
and p[−] = (1− λ)p
(1− λ)p+ λ(1− p)
for each p ∈ (0, 1), we have pιtt+1 = pιtt [+] or pιtt [−] according to whether xt = 1 or 0, and pit+1 = pit
for item i 6= ιt. Attention allocation is governed by a (pure) attention strategy α : [0, 1]2 −→ {1, 2}
that specifies the item of focus ιt = α(pt) of a DM with beliefs pt.
The DM stops and makes a choice once she is sufficiently sure that either (i) one of the items is
of high value or (ii) both items are of low value. Accordingly, we introduce thresholds p and p such
that p < z, pi0 < p. We define stopping regions F
i = {p : pi ≥ p} for i = 1, 2, F oo = {p : p1, p2 ≤ p}
and F = F 1 ∪ F 2 ∪ F oo. Learning stops in the period τ = min{t : pt ∈ F} with the DM choosing
item i if pτ ∈ F i and the outside option if pτ ∈ F oo. We let τ i denote the period in which the DM
chooses item i; that is, τ i = τ if item i is chosen and τ i =∞ otherwise. Note that τ and τ i depend
on the attention strategy; accordingly, we sometimes write τ(α) and τ i(α) if the attention strategy
α is not otherwise clear from the context.
The above rules specify, for any given pair of values v = (v1, v2), the joint stochastic process of
beliefs and focus of attention (pt, ιt)t, with the joint law denoted by P
v
α . For any strategy α and
pair of values v, we let the interim demand for item i,
Di(v;α) = Pvα
(
pτ ∈ F i
)
,
be the probability that the DM stops with the choice of i when the true values are v. (Stopping in
F 1 and F 2 are mutually exclusive.)
We are interested in how manipulation of the DM’s attention strategy affects her choice. To
this end, given a baseline strategy α, we introduce a manipulated strategy β constructed from α by
forcing the DM to focus on item 1 in the initial period and then returning to α in all subsequent
periods. That is, the item of focus β(p, t) in period t for beliefs p is given by
β(p, t) =
1 if t = 0,α(p) if t > 0.
We say that an attention strategy α is non-wasteful if α(p) 6= i for any p such that pi ≤ p.
Non-wasteful strategies do not focus on an item that the DM deems to have low value.
Proposition 1. Suppose that the baseline attention strategy α is non-wasteful. Forced focus on
item 1 in the first period
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1. (weakly) increases the demand for item 1 and decreases the demand for item 2; that is,
D1(v;β) ≥ D1(v;α)
and D2(v;β) ≤ D2(v;α)
for all pairs of values v ∈ {0, 1}2; and
2. accelerates the choice of item 1 and decelerates the choice of item 2; that is,
Pvα (τ
1≥t) ≥ Pvβ (τ1≥t)
and Pvα (τ
2≥t) ≤ Pvβ (τ2≥t)
for all pairs of values v ∈ {0, 1}2 and all t ∈ N.
When an item has low value, the DM’s belief about it tends to drift downward whenever she
focuses on it. Yet, perhaps surprisingly, the proposition indicates that forced focus on an item
boosts its demand even in this case.
The result is a special case of Theorem 1, and thus we provide only an informal proof here.
Imagine that there is a large (countably infinite) deck of cards for each item, with each card showing
a signal realization of 0 or 1. In each period t, the attention strategy chooses a deck α(pt) from
which to draw the next card, and then the DM updates the relevant belief based on the signal
shown on that card. Now consider the effect of manipulation on choice for a given ordering of each
deck of cards, where manipulation forces the first card to come from the deck for item 1. To avoid
trivialities, focus on the case in which, absent manipulation, the DM first draws from deck 2.
The DM chooses item 1 if her belief p1t reaches (at least) p before p
2
t does. Intuitively, forcing
the DM to draw first from deck 1 should only cause p1t to reach p sooner. There is a complication,
however, insofar as manipulation can cause the order of subsequent draws to change since the DM
may reach pairs of beliefs that she would not have reached otherwise. The key observation is that,
once we have fixed the ordering of the cards, we only need to keep track of how many cards the
baseline and manipulated strategies have drawn from each deck. At the end of the first period,
compared to the baseline strategy, the manipulated strategy is further ahead with deck 1 in the
sense that more cards have been drawn from deck 1. Correspondingly, the baseline strategy is
further ahead with deck 2. In each subsequent period, either the manipulated strategy remains
ahead with deck 1 (perhaps pulling even further ahead) and the baseline strategy remains ahead
with deck 2, or the numbers of draws from both decks under the baseline strategy “meet” the
numbers under the manipulated strategy. In the latter case, the beliefs under the two processes
coincide after the period in which they meet (since beliefs are independent of the order in which
signals are received). Therefore, the manipulation has no effect on choice if the two processes meet.
Accordingly, consider the case in which the two processes do not meet before one of them stops.
Suppose that the baseline strategy leads to the choice of item 1; that is, the belief about item 1
reaches p in some period τ before the belief about item 2 reaches p. Since the manipulated strategy
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is further ahead with deck 1 and behind with deck 2 in each period t < τ , it must be that under
the manipulated strategy, the belief about item 1 reaches p before the belief about item 2 does,
and does so no later than period τ . Therefore, the manipulated strategy also leads to the choice of
item 1, with this choice occurring no later than under the baseline strategy.
The argument for the statements about item 2 is symmetric. Suppose that the manipulated
strategy leads to the choice of item 2; that is, under the manipulated strategy, the belief about
item 2 reaches p in some period τˆ before the belief about item 1 does. Since the baseline strategy is
further ahead with deck 2 and behind with deck 1 in each period t < τˆ , under the baseline strategy,
the belief about item 2 reaches p before the belief about item 1 does, and does so no later than
period τˆ .
This argument shows that the statements in the proposition hold for each draw; it follows that
they also hold when averaging across draws.
3 General result for binary values
We now extend the setting to allow for more than two items, general signal structures, stochastic
attention strategies, and arbitrary length of the manipulation window. At the end of the learning
process, the DM chooses one item from the set I = {1, . . . , I} or an outside option with known
value z ∈ (0, 1). Each item i ∈ I has an uncertain value vi ∈ {0, 1}, and again, v = (v1, . . . , vI).
In each period t = 0, 1, . . ., the DM focuses on a single item. Her belief in period t that item
i is of high value (vi = 1) is denoted pit, and we write pt = (p
i
t)i for the belief vector in period
t.5 A (stochastic) attention strategy is a function α : (∆({0, 1}))I × N −→ ∆(I) that specifies a
probability distribution over items of focus as a function of the belief vector at the beginning of
a period together with the current time. We can think of α(p, t) as a vector (αi(p, t))i, where
αi(p, t) is the probability with which the DM focuses on item i in period t. An attention strategy
is stationary if it does not depend on time (i.e., if α(p, t) = α(p, t′) for all p, t, and t′), in which
case we simply write α(p) for α(p, t). If, for every p and t, an attention strategy α(p, t) assigns
probability one to a single item, then we say that it is a pure strategy, and abuse notation slightly
by writing α(p, t) for the item of focus.
The evolution of beliefs as a function of the attention strategy is as follows. The DM begins
with a prior belief vector p0 = (p
1
0, . . . , p
I
0). If the beliefs at the beginning of period t are pt and
the DM focuses on item i in period t, then the belief about item i follows a stochastic transition
φi : ∆({0, 1}) × {0, 1} −→ ∆ (∆({0, 1})) that depends on pit and on vi, while the beliefs about all
other items remain unchanged; that is, conditional on pt, pt+1 is a random variable such that p
i
t+1
is distributed according to φi(pit, v
i) and pjt+1 = p
j
t for all j 6= i. By fixing the DM’s beliefs about
items she is not currently focusing on, we are implicitly assuming that she treats the items’ values
as independent. One special case of this setting is when the DM receives a (serially conditionally
independent) signal about the item she focuses on and updates her belief according to Bayes’ rule.
5We identify the probability pit ∈ [0, 1] attached to vi = 1 with the corresponding belief in ∆({0, 1}).
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However, we also allow for non-Bayesian processes; for example, the “belief” pit could alternatively
represent the strength of a mental impulse towards choosing item i, or the DM could under- or
over-react to new information relative to Bayes’ law.
An attention strategy α naturally induces a process of items of focus (ιt)t and a process of belief
vectors (pt)t. The law of ιt conditional on (p0, ι0, . . . ,pt−1, ιt−1,pt) is α(pt, t), and the belief vector
pt+1 is drawn as described above, conditional on (p0, ι0, . . . ,pt−1, ιt−1,pt, ιt). Given any vector of
values v, we let Pvα denote the joint law of the process (pt, ιt)t.
The time at which the DM stops learning is governed by thresholds pi and pi for each i satisfying
0 ≤ pi < pi0, z < pi ≤ 1. If the DM’s belief pit satisfies pit ≤ pi then we say that she is sufficiently
certain that vi = 0, and similarly, if pit ≥ pi then she is sufficiently certain that vi = 1. The DM
learns until she is sufficiently certain of an optimal choice. We thus define the stopping region F
according to F =
(⋃
i F
i
) ∪ F oo, where F i = {p : pi ≥ pi} and F oo = {p : pi ≤ pi for all i}. The
DM makes her choice at the stopping time τ = min{t : pt ∈ F}: either pτ ∈ F i for some i, in
which case this i is chosen, or pτ ∈ F oo, in which case the outside option is chosen (these cases are
mutually exclusive). For any item i, let the stopping time τ i for i be equal to τ if i is chosen and
∞ otherwise. (We allow for the possibility that learning does not stop, in which case τ = τ i =∞
for all i.)
An attention strategy α is non-wasteful if αi(p, t) = 0 for all p such that pi ≤ pi. A non-wasteful
strategy never focuses on an item that the DM is sufficiently certain is of low value.
A special case of particular interest is when the thresholds are given by pi = 0 and pi = 1
for all i. These thresholds ensure that the DM learns until she is certain that she can make an
optimal choice (at which point she stops immediately). One type of learning that eventually leads
to certainty is that with Poisson information in which the DM is a Bayesian who receives a signal
about the item she focuses on that perfectly reveals its value with positive probability. (This
probability may depend on the item and its value.) Under such a learning process, thresholds of 0
and 1 are optimal for a DM who incurs a time cost of learning, but lexicographically prioritizes the
value of her choice above this cost. More generally, however, we do not endogenize the stopping
regions as resulting from optimization in a costly learning process; doing so would make for a
very challenging problem involving tradeoffs that are orthogonal to the effect we identify. The key
difference between our setting and one with endogenous boundaries is that we require the thresholds
pi and pi to be independent of the DM’s beliefs about other items j 6= i. When the thresholds
are interior, we interpret them as capturing bounded rationality that is particularly natural when
the cost of learning is low and the thresholds are close to 0 and 1 (in which case the additional
gain from precisely tailoring the thresholds is small). We conjecture that, in this case, our results
approximate those arising from optimal strategies in Bayesian models with a small cost of learning.
An attention strategy α satisfies Independence of Irrelevant Alternative i (IIAi) if, conditional
on not focusing on item i, the probabilities of focusing on each item j 6= i are independent of pi.
Formally, for every t and p,q ∈ (∆({0, 1}))I such that pj = qj for all j 6= i, αi(p, t), αi(q, t) 6= 1
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imply that, for every j 6= i,
αj(p, t)
1− αi(p, t) =
αj(q, t)
1− αi(q, t) .
We say that α satisfies Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA) if it satisfies IIAi for all items i.
Note that IIA is automatically satisfied if there are only two items.
We define the interim demand for item i as
Di(v;α) = Pvα
(
pτ ∈ F i
)
;
this is the probability, under strategy α, that the DM chooses item i when the vector of values is v.
We compare the interim demand under a baseline attention strategy to that under a manipulated
strategy capturing the effect of forced attention. Given a baseline strategy α, a target item i, and
a manipulation length m ≥ 1, the manipulated attention strategy (in favor of i) is
βj [α, i,m](p, t) =
1j=i if t ≤ m− 1, and pi > pi,α(p, t) otherwise.
Thus, under the manipulated attention strategy, the DM focuses on item i in the first m periods
unless she is sufficiently certain that i is of low value, and then follows her baseline strategy in
every subsequent period.6
The following proposition states that manipulation in favor of an item both increases and
accelerates demand for this item, and decreases and decelerates demand for each other item. (The
comparison of timing here is in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance.) The result holds
regardless of the underlying values: even if the target item is worse than other items, drawing
attention to it is never detrimental to the likelihood that it is chosen.
Theorem 1. If an attention strategy α is stationary, satisfies IIAi, and is non-wasteful, then for
every v and manipulation length m ≥ 1,
Di(v;β[α, i,m]) ≥ Di(v;α)
and Dj(v;β[α, i,m]) ≤ Dj(v;α) for every j 6= i.
Moreover, for every t ≥ 0,
Pvα (τ
i≥t) ≥ Pvβ[α,i,m](τ i≥t)
and Pvα (τ
j≥t) ≤ Pvβ[α,i,m](τ j≥t) for every j 6= i.
6Since Theorem 1 holds for any manipulation length, m can be randomized without affecting the conclusion.
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3.1 Proof of Theorem 1
The proof relies on a technique known as “coupling” (see, e.g., Lindvall, 1992): we fix the vector of
values v and construct a common probability space on which we can compare the process of beliefs
and items of focus (pt, ιt)t under the baseline attention strategy α with the process (pˆt, ιˆt)t under
the manipulated strategy β = β[α, i,m]. We construct this space in such a way that the law of
(pt, ιt)t is P
v
α , while the law of (pˆt, ιˆt)t is P
v
β .
We present here a coupling construction that suffices to prove the proposition for pure attention
strategies. In Appendix A.1, we extend the construction to stochastic attention strategies, in which
case the coupling argument is significantly more complex.
The probability space consists of realizations of a learning process pi = (pij)Ij=1. The process
pi is a family of independent learning processes pij = (pijκ)κ=0,1,... for each item j, where pi
j is a
Markov process starting at pj0 with transitions φ
j(·, vj). The κth term pijκ of the learning process
for item j specifies the belief about item j after κ periods of focus on that item. A learning draw
is a realization of the learning process pi.
We now construct, for each pure strategy γ ∈ {α, β}, a realization of the process (pt(γ), ιt(γ))t
as a function of the learning draw. Recursively define (pt(γ), ιt(γ))t as follows. For t ≥ 0, and
given the process (ιs(γ))s<t, for each item j, let k(j, t; γ) denote the cumulative focus of strategy γ
on item j before period t; that is,
k(j, t; γ) = |{s < t : ιs(γ) = j}|.
Similarly, let k(−i, t; γ) = t− k(i, t; γ) denote the number of periods of focus on items other than i.
Set pjt (γ) = pi
j
k(j,t;γ) for every j; i.e., set the belief about each item j after k(j, t; γ) periods of focus
on this item to be the k(j, t; γ)-th value of the learning process pij . Given γ, let the focus in period
t be ιt(γ) = γ(pt). By construction, the law of the process (pt(γ), ιt(γ))t is P
v
γ , as needed.
For notational purposes, it is convenient to extend the process (pt(γ), ιt(γ))t beyond the stop-
ping time τ . To this end, if pt(γ) ∈ F , then we set ιt(γ) = ∅ and pt+1(γ) = pt(γ). From this point
forward, we write (pt, ιt) for (pt(α), ιt(α)), (pˆt, ιˆt) for (pt(β), ιt(β)), and similarly for k, and τ . We
fix a learning draw and compare the two corresponding realizations of the processes (pt, ιt)t and
(pˆt, ιˆt)t.
For any n ≥ 0, let t(n) be the n-th period such that ιt 6= i; that is, t(n) = min{t : k(−i, t) ≥ n},
where potentially t(n) =∞, and similarly, tˆ(n) = min{t : kˆ(−i, t) ≥ n}.
Lemma 1 (Coupling Lemma). The baseline and manipulated processes coincide when restricted to
periods of focus on items other than the target i. That is, for every n,(
p−it(0), ιt(0), . . . ,p
−i
t(n), ιt(n)
)
=
(
pˆ−i
tˆ(0)
, ιˆˆt(0), . . . , pˆ
−i
tˆ(n)
, ιˆˆt(n)
)
.
Proofs omitted in the main text can be found in the appendix.
For t ≥ m, we say that the baseline and the manipulated processes meet (in period t) if
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the cumulative focus on the target item i up to time t is the same for both processes, i.e. if
k(i, t) = kˆ(i, t). Note that for the two processes to meet, the definition considers only the cumulative
focus on the target item. In general, this does not imply that the cumulative focus on any other
item coincides under the two processes at time t (see counterexamples 4.3 and 4.4). The previous
result shows that when stationarity and IIAi hold, meeting of the two processes implies that the
cumulative focus is the same for every item. According to the next result, the processes then
coincide in every subsequent period.
Lemma 2 (Meeting Lemma). If the baseline and manipulated processes meet in period t, then
(ps, ιs) = (pˆs, ιˆs) for all s ≥ t.
The Meeting Lemma implies the next result.
Lemma 3 (Attention Lemma). In every period, the cumulative focus on the target item i is at
least as large under the manipulated process as under the baseline process, and the cumulative focus
on any j 6= i is at least as large under the baseline process as under the manipulated process. That
is, for every t ≥ 1 and j 6= i,
kˆ(i, t) ≥ k(i, t)
and k(j, t) ≥ kˆ(j, t).
For any attention strategy γ, let τ oo(γ) = τ(γ) if pτ(γ) ∈ F oo (and thus the outside option is
chosen) and τ oo(γ) =∞ (indicating that the outside option is not chosen) otherwise.
Lemma 4 (Outside Option Lemma). For any two non-wasteful attention strategies γ and γ′ and
any learning draw, τ oo(γ) = τ oo(γ′).
The Outside Option Lemma implies in particular that the outside option is chosen under the
baseline process if and only if it is chosen under the manipulated process. Thus attention ma-
nipulation merely shifts demand within I and does not affect the total demand across all of the
items.
Lemma 5 (Choice Lemma). For any learning draw,
1. if the target item i is chosen under the baseline process, then i is also chosen under the
manipulated process, and no later than under the baseline process; and
2. if some item j 6= i is chosen under the manipulated process, then j is also chosen under the
baseline process, and no later than under the manipulated process.
Proof. Statement 1 : Consider any learning draw such that the target item i is chosen in period
τ under the baseline process. Then, by the Outside Option Lemma, the outside option is not
chosen under the manipulated process since it is not chosen under the baseline process. Suppose
for contradiction that j 6= i is chosen at some time τˆ ≤ τ under the manipulated process. Then
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pˆjτˆ ≥ pj . By the Attention Lemma, the cumulative focus on items −i by period τˆ under the baseline
process is at least as large as that under the manipulated process; that is, k(−i, τˆ) ≥ kˆ(−i, τˆ). By
the Coupling Lemma, there exists a period t ≤ τˆ such that p−it = pˆ−iτˆ , and hence the baseline
process stops with the choice of j in period t, which establishes the contradiction since stopping in
F i and F j are mutually exclusive for j 6= i. Therefore, it cannot be that, under the manipulated
process, an item j 6= i is chosen at a time τˆ ≤ τ . By the Attention Lemma, kˆ(i, t) ≥ k(i, t) for all
t. Hence, there exists τˆ ≤ τ such that pˆiτˆ = piτ ≥ pi (since the manipulated process does not stop
with the choice of j 6= i or the outside option before τˆ). Thus, the manipulated process stops at
time τˆ ≤ τ with the choice of i, as needed.
Statement 2 : The proof of the second statement is symmetric to that of the first. Accordingly,
consider any draw such that, under the manipulated process, an item j 6= i is chosen in period
τˆ . Then, by the Outside Option Lemma, the baseline process does not choose the outside option.
Suppose for contradiction that, under the baseline process, the target item i is chosen in some
period τ ≤ τˆ . Then piτ ≥ pi. By the Attention Lemma, kˆ(i, τ) ≥ k(i, τ). Thus, there exists a
period t ≤ τ such pˆit = piτ ≥ pi and hence under the manipulated process, i is chosen in period
t ≤ τˆ , which establishes the contradiction. Therefore, it cannot be that, under the baseline process,
i is chosen at a time τ ≤ τˆ . By the Attention Lemma, k(−i, t) ≥ kˆ(−i, t) for all t. By the Coupling
Lemma, the beliefs p−i and pˆ−i coincide when restricted to the periods of focus on items −i. Hence,
there exists τ ≤ τˆ such that p−iτ = pˆ−iτˆ , and the baseline process stops in period τ with the choice
of item j, as needed.
Theorem 1 follows from the Choice Lemma by taking expectations across learning draws.
3.2 IIA and stationarity
We now provide an argument in support of the IIA and stationarity assumptions based on opti-
mization of the attention strategy. We fix, for each item i, the belief-updating process φi and the
stopping thresholds pi and pi, and let the DM control her attention strategy α. We assume in this
section that the beliefs follow a Markov process (unconditional on v), as is the case if they are
obtained through Bayesian updating based on observed signals. Until she stops learning, the DM
pays a flow cost 0 ≤ c (pιtt , ιt) ≤ c in each period t, where this flow cost may depend on the item ιt
of current focus and on the belief pιtt in the current period; c is a finite upper bound on the flow
cost. The DM chooses a strategy α to minimize the expected discounted flow cost
C(α) = E
τ∑
t=0
δtc (pιtt , ιt) , (2)
where δ ∈ (0, 1) is a discount factor. Note that such a cost-minimizing strategy is necessarily
non-wasteful.
We rely here on the theory of multi-armed bandits to show that a Gittins index strategy is
optimal: for each item i, there exists a Gittins index function Gi(pit) that depends only on the
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belief about item i, such that the optimal strategy consists in each period of focusing on an item
with the highest Gittins index. When ties are broken with uniform randomization, such a strategy
satisfies IIA and stationarity.
Proposition 2. There exists a non-wasteful strategy that minimizes the objective (2) and satisfies
IIA and stationarity.
The main challenge in proving this result is that the cost in (2) exhibits interdependence across
items because whether the decision process stops with the DM choosing the outside option depends
on the whole profile of beliefs. Since the theory of multi-armed bandits applies to problems with
flow payoffs that are independent across objects, we need to construct an auxiliary multi-armed
bandit problem with this property. The construction is based on Lemma 4 (the Outside Option
Lemma), which states that, conditional on the outside option being chosen, the stopping time is
independent of the attention strategy. This construction applies because the stopping thresholds
are independent of the DM’s beliefs about the other items; if both the attention strategy and the
stopping region are chosen jointly to maximize the expected value of the choice less the cost of
learning as in Nikandrova and Pancs (2018) and Ke and Villas-Boas (2017), then there need not
exist an optimal Gittins index strategy.
4 Examples and counterexamples
4.1 Example: the fastest strategy
To illustrate the quantitative impact of manipulating attention, we return to the example from
Section 2 and examine the fastest attention strategy (for the given stopping thresholds). This
strategy has a simple form that allows for analytical computation. Whenever manipulation changes
the DM’s focus in the first period, we show that it has a nonzero impact on demand.
Recall from Section 2 that if the DM has beliefs pt and focuses on item j ∈ {1, 2} in period t,
she updates her belief about j to pjt [−] with probability (1 − λ)vj + λ(1 − vj) and to pjt [+] with
probability λvj+(1−λ)(1−vj), where p[−] and p[+] are specified in (1). For simplicity, assume that
the stopping thresholds p and p are the same for the two items, and that each of these thresholds
can be reached exactly through some sequence of signals.7 Thus, the set of attainable beliefs takes
the form {p, p[+], . . . , p[−], p}, which is the same for both items.
Recall that Pvα denotes the interim law of the learning process for given values v and strategy α.
Let P eaα = EP
v
α be the ex ante law, where the expectation is with respect to v, distributed according
to the prior belief vector p0; that is, P
ea
α =
∑
v
(∏
j p
j
0(v
j)
)
Pvα . The stopping time τ
ea(α) for
strategy α is the minimal time t at which pt(α) ∈ F under the law P eaα .
7On its own, the latter assumption is without loss of generality since moving a threshold within a region between
attainable beliefs has no effect. When combined with the commonality of the thresholds, this assumption places a
restriction on the prior belief vector.
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The strategy α∗ depicted in Figure 1A focuses on whichever item the DM views as more promis-
ing. Accordingly, for each item j and i 6= j,
α∗j(p) =

1 if pj > pi,
1/2 if pj = pi,
0 otherwise.
(3)
The next result states that α∗ is the fastest attention strategy in this environment. Hence α∗ is
optimal for a DM who, given F , minimizes a monotone time cost.
Proposition 3. For any strategy α, τ ea(α) weakly first-order stochastically dominates τ ea(α∗).
As with our main results, the proof makes use of coupling, although the particular construction
is distinct from our main one. A different coupling construction is necessary because the strategy
α∗ is not the fastest one in every learning draw: there exist draws in which focusing on the more
promising item leads to a long sequence of contradictory signals.
The effect of manipulation identified in Theorem 1 is strict when the DM employs α∗ provided
the manipulation is nontrivial. Consider a manipulated strategy β = β[α∗, i, 1] that targets item i
for one period. Assume that pj0 ≥ pi0 for j 6= i (otherwise, α∗ focuses on i initially and the baseline
and manipulated processes trivially coincide). This manipulation generates a strict increase in the
demand for the target item; that is,
Di(v;β) > Di(v;α∗)
for all v. To see this, recall from the Choice Lemma that in any draw, if the target item is chosen
under the baseline process, then it is also chosen under the manipulated one. Hence, the impact of
manipulation is strict if there exists a positive measure of draws in which β chooses i and α∗ does
not. We construct such draws as follows.
Let the learning draw piiκ for the target item i be an increasing sequence until it reaches p.
Thus, i is chosen by either strategy γ ∈ {α∗, β} if pit(γ) > pjt (γ) in some period t ≥ 1, since the DM
focuses on i thereafter until she chooses it. For item j 6= i, recalling that pj0 ≥ pi0, let pijκ decrease
until it reaches pi0, and increase thereafter until it reaches the threshold p. The decision process
stops in finite time in this learning draw. Consider draws such that, when the tie between the two
beliefs occurs, the DM focuses on j. Such draws have a nonzero probability. By construction, in
these draws, the strategy α∗ leads to the choice of item j, while β eventually switches focus from
j to i and then continues to learn about i until it is chosen.
How much does the manipulation of attention affect demand? To quantify the effect, define the
ex ante demand by
Diea(p0;α) = P
ea
α
(
pτ ∈ F i
)
= Ep0 D
i(v;α). (4)
Thus Diea(p0;α) is the (ex ante) probability that a DM with prior beliefs p0 chooses item i. The
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Figure 1: A: attention strategy α∗. B: ex ante demand D1ea(p1, p2;α∗) for item 1 as a function
of p1. The belief p2 is fixed at .55 (solid curve), or .45 (dashed curve), respectively. The stopping
thresholds are p = .27 and p = .73. The values depicted on the horizontal axis are attainable
transient beliefs for the given information structure.
change in the ex ante demand for the target item i resulting from a single-period manipulation is
EDiea
(
p˜i, p−i;α
)−Diea(pi, p−i;α),
where p˜i is the belief resulting from a one-period update of pi, and the expectation is over the
possible values pi[+] and pi[−] of p˜i. The magnitude of the effect is therefore determined by the
curvature of Diea(p
−i, pi;α) with respect to pi around p.
Appendix A.4 provides an explicit expression for Diea(p;α
∗) under the strategy α∗. Figure 1B
depicts the ex ante demand as a function of p1 for two values of the belief p2. The curvature of
the demand function, and hence the strength of the manipulation effect, is large when both beliefs
are high (and when p1 ≤ p2, which is necessary for the two processes to differ). This is because
the DM’s choice can be manipulated only in learning draws (piiκ)
i
κ in which both pi
1
κ and pi
2
κ reach
the high threshold p before they reach p, since the choices under the two strategies coincide in all
other draws. Thus the manipulation is more likely to have an effect when p1 and p2 are high.
4.2 Counterexample: no outside option
To illustrate the role of the outside option in our main result, we now consider a variant of the
example from Section 2 in which there is no outside option. The main result does not go through:
manipulating attention toward an item may decrease its demand even if the attention strategy is
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Figure 2: A: attention strategy α∗∗. B: demand D1no(p1, p2;α∗∗) for item 1 as a function of p1. The
belief p2 is fixed at .55 (solid curve), or .45 (dashed curve), respectively. The stopping thresholds
are p = .27 and p = .73. The values depicted on the horizontal axis are attainable transient beliefs
for the given information structure.
optimized.
The DM must choose one of two items i ∈ {1, 2} with values vi ∈ {0, 1}. She stops learning as
soon as she is sufficiently certain about the value of one of the items: if she is sufficiently certain
that an item has high value then she chooses it, and if she is sufficiently certain that an item has
low value then she chooses the other item. Let F ino be the set of beliefs at which the DM stops
learning and chooses i, that is,
F ino =
{
p : pi ≥ pi or p−i ≤ p−i} ,
and let Fno = F
1
no ∪ F 2no. Define the stopping time under the law P eaα to be τ eano(α) = min{t : pt ∈
Fno}; to simplify notation, we write τ in place of τ eano(α) when the meaning is clear from the context.
Relative to the setting with an outside option, the current stopping rule differs in that the DM
stops as soon as she is sufficiently certain that she has identified the better item, even if she has
little certainty about whether that item has high value.
For simplicity, assume that (i) the threshold beliefs are the same for the two items, (ii) p = 1−p,
and (iii) each of these thresholds can be reached exactly through some sequence of signals. Thus,
the set of attainable beliefs for each item takes the form {p, p[+], . . . , p[−], p} and is symmetric
around 1/2.
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Let α∗∗j(p) be the strategy that focuses on the item about which the DM is more certain; that
is, for j 6= i, let
α∗∗j(p) =

1 if |pj − 1/2| > |pi − 1/2|,
1/2 if |pj − 1/2| = |pi − 1/2|,
0 otherwise.
(5)
Figure 2A depicts this strategy, which, as the following result indicates, is the fastest attention
strategy in this setting.
Proposition 4. For any strategy α, τ eano(α) weakly first-order stochastically dominates τ
ea
no(α
∗∗).
For any strategy α, let Dino(p0;α) be the ex ante demand for item i; that is,
Dino(p0;α) = P
ea
α
(
pτ ∈ F ino
)
.
We analytically characterize Dino(p;α
∗∗) in Appendix A.5 and plot it in Figure 2B as a function
of p1. When p2 is less than 1/2, the demand is concave in p1, which indicates that manipulating
attention toward item 1 decreases its demand. To understand why, consider a learning draw in
which both pi1κ and pi
2
κ reach p before p. In any such draw, the DM eliminates the first item for
which her belief reaches p, and thus manipulating attention toward an item increases its chance of
being eliminated.8
The reversal of our result in this example arises because of the change in the stopping region,
not because of the strategy α∗∗. Since Theorem 1 applies to any attention strategy, if the DM
employs α∗∗ in the setting with an outside option, manipulation (weakly) increases the demand for
the target item.
The presence of an outside option affects demand in two different ways: (i) directly, by allowing
the DM not to choose either item, and (ii) indirectly, by affecting the stopping region. It turns
out that (i) is irrelevant for the direction of the manipulation effect; the difference between the two
settings is driven by (ii).
To disentangle the two channels, consider an alternative model in which there is no outside
option, and the stopping region is that from our main setting. Thus learning stops with the choice
of item i whenever pτ ∈ F i = {p : pi ≥ p} for some i, and with an equal probability of choosing
either item whenever pτ ∈ F oo = {p : p1, p2 ≤ p}. The (ex ante) demand for item i is therefore
Dialt(p0;α) = P
ea
α
(
pτ ∈ F i
)
+
1
2
P eaα (pτ ∈ F oo)
= Diea(p0;α) +
1
2
P eaα (pτ ∈ F oo)
= Diea(p0;α) +
1
2
p− p10
p− p
p− p20
p− p , (6)
8When p2 is greater than 1/2, the demand in Figure 2B is convex in p
1, and thus manipulating attention toward
item 1 boosts its demand. This effect arises due to draws in which both pi1κ and pi
2
κ reach p before p.
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where Diea(p;α) is the demand defined in (4) from the example with an outside option. The second
summand in (6) is linear in pi0 for each i. Thus the impact of a single-period manipulation toward
target i is
EDialt
(
p˜i, p−i;α
)−Dialt(p;α) = EDiea (p˜i, p−i;α)−Diea(p;α),
where p˜i is the belief resulting from a one-period update of pi, and the expectation is over the
possible values pi[+] and pi[−] of p˜i. Therefore, the impact of manipulation in this alternative
model is the same as in our main model with an outside option; the presence of the outside option
affects the impact of manipulation only through the stopping region.9
4.3 Counterexample: failure of IIA
The result in Theorem 1 does not generally hold if the attention strategy does not satisfy IIA. To
illustrate, consider an example with three items and a Bayesian DM with prior belief pi0 = 1/2 for
each item i. If the DM’s belief about an item i is pit in period t, focusing on i in t leads to belief
pit+1 = p
i
t[−] or pit[+] as in Section 2. The stopping boundaries are p = 12 [−][−] and p = 12 [+][+]
for each item. Let α be a stationary pure attention strategy satisfying α(p0) = 2, α(p) = 1 when
p2 6= p20 and p1 > 12 [−][−], and α(p10[−], p20, p3) = α(p10[+], p20, p3) = 3 for all p3 > 12 [−][−]. When
following such a strategy, the DM first focuses on item 2, and then, from the second period onwards,
focuses on item 1 until p1 reaches p or p. This leads to item 1 being chosen with probability 1/2.
Now consider the manipulated strategy β = β[α, 1, 1] obtained by forcing the DM to focus on
item 1 in the first period. From the second period onwards, the DM focuses on item 3 until p3
reaches p or p, and thus β chooses item 1 only if p3 reaches p and p1 reaches p. Therefore, the
manipulated DM chooses the target item 1 with probability at most 1/4.
The strategy α violates the IIAi assumption for i = 1 since the allocation of attention between
items 2 and 3 at p−1 = (p20, p30) depends on the belief about item 1. A failure of IIA can cause
the Meeting Lemma to be violated: the baseline and manipulated processes may meet but not
coincide thereafter. Recall that two processes meet at some time if, by that time, they focus on
the target item for the same number of periods. In this example, the baseline and manipulated
processes meet after the first two periods since both focus on the target item (item 1) once. Yet the
baseline beliefs p−12 and the manipulated beliefs pˆ
−1
2 about the non-target items differ, and hence
the continuations of the processes differ as well.
4.4 Counterexample (failure of stationarity)
We now show that the result of Theorem 1 can fail if the attention strategy satisfies IIA but is
non-stationary. Suppose there are three items with prior beliefs pi0 = 1/2 for each i. For items 1
and 2, the learning process is the same as in the previous counterexample. For item 3, the value is
9In Section 5, we extend the model to allow for multiple values. There, we abstract from the presence of the
outside option, and instead assume that the DM wishes to learn the value of the chosen item. The demand defined
in Section 5 is thus an extension of that in the alternative model described here.
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perfectly revealed whenever the DM focuses on it for a single period. The stopping thresholds are
1
2 [−][−] and 12 [+][+] for each item.
Consider a non-stationary pure attention strategy satisfying the following conditions whenever
p1 > 12 [−][−]:
α(p, t) =

2 if t = 0,
3 if t = 1, p1 6= p10, and p3 > 12 [−][−],
1 otherwise.
Under this strategy, the DM first focuses on item 2, and then focuses on item 1 until p1 reaches p or
p. Hence she chooses item 1 with probability 1/2. Under the manipulated strategy β = β[α, 1, 1],
the DM first focuses on item 1, and then focuses on item 3—thereby learning its value—in the
second period. Thus the DM chooses item 1 only if item 3 has value 0 and p1 reaches p, which
occurs with probability 1/4.
As in the previous counterexample, Theorem 1 does not apply because the Meeting Lemma
fails. The baseline and manipulated processes meet after two periods since each focuses on item
1 for exactly one of those periods. However, the beliefs about items 2 and 3 differ between these
two processes at t = 2, which causes the continuation of the processes to differ. When IIAi
and stationarity are satisfied, the Meeting Lemma follows from the fact that, for each draw, the
accumulated focus k(i, t) on the target item i is a sufficient statistic for the distribution of beliefs
pt about all items in period t.
5 Multiple values
We now extend the model from Section 3 to allow for the values of the items to lie in a finite set
V ⊂ R. Instead of comparing items to an outside option, we assume that the DM chooses an item i
only if the belief pi lies in a fixed set. Our main interpretation is that the DM wants to be informed
about the chosen item, which may be useful for subsequent decisions in which the optimal action
depends on the chosen item’s value; accordingly, she stops learning only once she is sufficiently
certain of this value. For example, one can think of the previous setup as involving a choice among
items followed by a subsequent decision of whether to trade the chosen item for the outside option.
Even in the absence of an outside option, an investor choosing among projects may not be content
merely to learn that one project is likely to be better than the alternatives if information about
the chosen project will help with other investment decisions.
As before, an attention strategy α(p, t) specifies the probability distribution over the focus in
period t at beliefs p ∈ (∆(V ))I . For pj ∈ ∆(V ), φj(pj , vj) ∈ ∆(∆(V )) describes the distribution
over beliefs about item j after one period of focus on this item starting from belief pj when the true
value is vj . We extend the stopping rule from Section 3 as follows. For each item j and value v,
there is a nonempty sufficient certainty region Cj(v) ⊂ ∆(V ). When pj ∈ Cj(v), we say that the
DM is sufficiently certain that item j has value v. Let Cj =
⋃
v∈V C
j(v) denote the set of beliefs at
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which the DM is sufficiently certain of the value of item j. Similarly, for each j and v, there exists
a nonempty dominated region Lj(v) ⊂ ∆(V ). When pj ∈ Lj(v), we say that item j is v-dominated,
with the interpretation that the DM is sufficiently certain that the value of item j is at most v. If
for some v and i, pj ∈ Lj(v) and pi ∈ Ci(v), we say that j is dominated.
For any I∗ ⊆ I and any v, define the stopping region to be
F (I∗, v) = {p : pj ∈ Cj(v) for all j ∈ I∗ and pj ∈ Lj(v) for all j ∈ I \ I∗} .
Thus F (I∗, v) consists of those beliefs at which the DM is sufficiently certain that items in I∗ have
value v and all other items are v-dominated. Let F I∗ =
⋃
v F (I∗, v); whenever p ∈ F I
∗
, we say
that the DM deems items in I∗ optimal. Finally, let F = ⋃I∗ F I∗ . The DM stops learning and
makes a choice as soon as pt ∈ F ; accordingly, τ = min{t : pt ∈ F} is the stopping time for the
learning process. (Again, we allow for the possibility that the process does not stop.) This stopping
rule formalizes the assumption that the DM only stops when she is sufficiently certain of the value
of the chosen item (and that it is optimal).
One example of particular interest is that of a Bayesian DM who receives signals that eventu-
ally, with some probability, perfectly reveal the value of the item she focuses on (as with Poisson
learning). The DM may then always choose an optimal item, and stop learning as soon as she is
certain of an optimal choice and of its value. In this case, the sets Ci(v) are singletons consisting
of the belief that attaches probability one to item i having value v, and the sets Li(v) consist of
those beliefs that attach probability one to the event that vi ≤ v.
We impose two restrictions on the attention strategy α:
1. non-wastefulness I : if p /∈ F and pj ∈ Cj , then αj(p, t) = 0; and
2. non-wastefulness II : if p /∈ F , and, for some v, pj ∈ Lj(v) and pj′ ∈ Cj′(v) for some j′, then
αj(p, t) = 0.
The first of these properties states that the DM does not focus on an item if she is sufficiently
certain of its value. The second states that she does not focus on any item that is dominated.
For example, in the case with perfectly revealing signals described above, these two properties are
satisfied if she always focuses on an item for which the maximum of the support of the belief is the
highest. One such strategy, which also satisfies stationarity and IIA, is when α(p) selects uniformly
from arg maxj v(p
j), where v(pj) = max{v ∈ V : pj(v) > 0}.10
Unlike the setting with binary values, with multiple values, the DM may deem more than one
item optimal at the stopping time. Her choice then depends on a tie-breaking rule. Accordingly, let
σ(j, I∗) be the probability that the DM chooses item j if she deems the items in I∗ optimal. Assume
that (i) σ(j, I∗) = 0 if j /∈ I∗ (optimality), and (ii) σ(j, I∗) ≥ σ(j,J ∗) if I∗ ⊆ J ∗ (monotonicity).
For instance, these two properties hold if the DM selects uniformly from I∗. The interim demand
10In particular, non-wastefulness I holds because if the DM is certain of an item in arg maxj v(p
j) then the process
stops.
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for item j under attention strategy α is
Dj(v;α) =
∑
I∗
Pvα
(
pτ ∈ F I∗
)
σ(j, I∗).
As before, to compare the stopping times under the baseline and manipulated processes, let τ j = τ
if item j is chosen, and τ j =∞ otherwise. Given any α and v, τ j has distribution function
Hj(t;v, α) =
∑
τ ′≤t,v,I∗
Pvα
(
pτ ′ ∈ F I∗
)
σ (j, I∗) .
Let β[α, i,m] = β denote the manipulated strategy constructed from the baseline strategy α
by forcing the DM to focus on the target item i in periods t = 0, . . . ,m − 1 whenever the DM
is not sufficiently certain about the value of i and i is not dominated; that is, βj(p, t) = 1j=i if
t ≤ m − 1, pi 6∈ Ci, and there is no item j and value v such that pj ∈ Cj(v) and pi ∈ Li(v), and
β(p, t) = α(p, t) otherwise. Note that β inherits non-wastefulness I and II from α.
We conclude with the following generalization of Theorem 1.
Theorem 2. If an attention strategy α satisfies stationarity, IIAi, and non-wastefulness properties
I and II, then for every v and m ≥ 1,
Di(v;β[α, i,m]) ≥ Di(v;α), (7)
Dj(v;β[α, i,m]) ≤ Dj(v;α) for all j 6= i, (8)
and, for every t ≥ 0,
H i(t;v, α) ≤ H i(t;v, β) (9)
and Hj(t;v, α) ≥ Hj(t;v, β) for all j 6= i. (10)
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A Proofs
A.1 Proofs for Section 3
To accommodate stochastic attention strategies, we introduce the attention process describing, for
each time t, (i) for each belief vector p = (pi,p−i), whether the DM focuses on the target item i,
and (ii) for each p−i, which item she focuses on when she does not focus on i. The attention process
is given by a family of random variables (ap,t)p,t, (bp−i,t)p−i,t where all draws are independent and
independent of the learning process. The random variable ap,t takes values in {0, 1}; the probability
that it takes the value 1 is αi(p). The random variable bp−i,t takes values in I \ {i}. For a fixed
value of p−i, if there exists pi such that αi(pi,p−i) 6= 1, then the probability that bp−i,t takes the
value j 6= i is αj (pi,p−i) /(1− αi (pi,p−i)), where we note that the particular value of pi in the
formula is irrelevant since α satisfies IIAi.11 A realization of the attention process is called an
attention draw. We refer to the pair of the learning and attention draws simply as a draw.
We now recursively construct, for stochastic attention strategies γ ∈ {α, β}, the processes
(pt(γ), ιt(γ))t as functions of the learning and attention processes. As in the construction for the
pure strategies in subsection 3.1, let the belief pjt (γ) = pi
j
k(j,t;γ) where k(j, t; γ) is the cumulative
focus on item j in periods 0, . . . , t − 1. We proceed to construct the focus ιt(γ). Suppose that
11The specification of bp−i,t when no such p
i exists is immaterial for our purposes.
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pt /∈ F . Given a sequence of beliefs and focus items (ps(γ), ιs(γ))s<t and any vector p−i of beliefs
about j 6= i, we let µ (p−i, t; γ) be the total number of periods starting with belief p−i about items
j 6= i in which the DM has not focused on the target item i under the strategy γ before time t;
that is,
µ(p−i, t; γ) = |{s < t : p−is (γ) = p−i, ιs(γ) 6= i}|.
Let ιt(γ) = i if apt(γ),t = 1 and ιt(γ) = bp−it (γ),µ(p
−i
t (γ),t;γ)
otherwise. Note a subtlety in the
construction: the element ap,t of the attention draw deciding whether the focus at p is on the
target item i depends on t, while the element bp−i,µ(p−i,t;γ) of the draw deciding the item of focus
conditional on its not being i depends on µ(p−i, t; γ). This asymmetry in the construction is
exploited in the proof of Lemma 2.
By construction, conditional on (p0(γ), ι0(γ), . . . ,pt−1(γ), ιt−1(γ),pt(γ)), ιt(γ) is distributed
according to α(pt(γ)). Conditional on (p0(γ), ι0(γ), . . . ,pt(γ), ιt(γ)), p
j
t+1(γ) = p
j
t (γ) for all j 6=
ιt(γ), and p
ιt(γ)
t+1 (γ) is distributed according to the transition probability φ
ιt(γ)
(
p
ιt(γ)
t (γ), v
ιt(γ)
)
.
Therefore, the law of the process (pt(γ), ιt(γ))t is P
v
γ , as needed.
Proof of Lemma 1 (Coupling Lemma). We prove the result by induction. The property holds for
n = 0 since p−it(0) = pˆ
−i
tˆ(0)
= p−i0 . Assume it holds for n. For item j = ιt(n) = ιˆˆt(n), we have
pjt(n+1) = pi
j
k(j,t(n))+1 = pi
j
kˆ(j,ˆt(n))+1
= pˆj
tˆ(n+1)
. For items j 6= i, ιt(n) that do not receive attention
in periods t(n) and tˆ(n), respectively, we have pjt(n+1) = p
j
t(n) = pˆ
j
t(n) = pˆ
j
tˆ(n+1)
. We thus have
p−it(n+1) = pˆ
−i
tˆ(n+1)
.
It remains to show that the items of attention in period t(n+ 1) of the baseline process and in
period tˆ(n+ 1) of the manipulated process coincide. By the definitions of the attention processes,
we have
ιt(n+1) = bp−i
t(n+1)
,µ
(
p−i
t(n+1)
,t(n+1)
) = b
pˆ−i
tˆ(n+1)
,µ
(
pˆ−i
tˆ(n+1)
,t(n+1)
) = b
pˆ−i
tˆ(n+1)
,µˆ
(
pˆ−i
tˆ(n+1)
,ˆt(n+1)
) = ιˆˆt(n+1)
since, by the induction hypothesis, µ(pˆ−it(n+1), t(n+ 1)) = µˆ(pˆ
−i
tˆ(n+1)
, tˆ(n+ 1)).
The next proof exploits the subtlety in the coupling construction mentioned above. The subtlety
ensures that if the processes meet in period t, they coincide thereafter. The event that they meet in
period t implies that the two processes have visited each vector p−i in the same number of periods,
but it does not ensure that the number of periods they visited each vector p is the same. To this
end, the draw at in the coupling construction does not depend on the number of periods that p
was visited (as it could be different for the two processes), but rather on t.
Proof of Lemma 2 (Meeting Lemma). Suppose the processes meet in period t, and thus k(−i, t) =
kˆ(−i, t). Hence, by the Coupling Lemma,(
p−it(0), ιt(0) . . . ,p
−i
t(k(−i,t)), ιt(k(−i,t))
)
=
(
pˆ−i
tˆ(0)
, ιˆˆt(0), . . . , pˆ
−i
tˆ(kˆ(−i,t)), ιˆˆt(kˆ(−i,t))
)
.
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Therefore, for every j ∈ I, k(j, t) = kˆ(j, t), so that the cumulative focus on each item before time
t is the same in the two processes, which implies that pt = pˆt. The baseline process focuses on
the target item i at time t if and only if the manipulated process focuses on i at t, since both
processes focus on i at t if apt,t = apˆt,t = 1. The baseline process focuses on item j 6= i at
time t if and only if the manipulated process focuses on j at t, since the baseline process focuses
on j at t if bp−it ,µ(p
−i
t ,t)
= j, the manipulated process focuses on j in t if bpˆ−it ,µˆ(pˆ
−i
t ,t)
= j, and
µ(p−it , t) = µˆ(pˆ
−i
t , t) by the Coupling Lemma. Thus ιt = ιˆt.
Note that k(i, t + 1) = kˆ(i, t + 1). Therefore, if the two processes meet in period t ≥ m, they
also meet in period t+ 1, and hence in every period s ≥ t. Thus, (pt, ιs) = (pˆt, ιˆs) for all s ≥ t.
Proof of Lemma 3 (Attention Lemma). The statement obviously holds for every t ≤ m. Since
kˆ(i,m) = m ≥ k(i,m), and kˆ(i, t) = k(i, t) implies kˆ(i, s) = k(i, s) for every s > t, we have
kˆ(i, t) ≥ k(i, t) and kˆ(−i, t) ≤ k(−i, t) for every t > m. The Coupling Lemma implies that items
j 6= i are explored in the same order under both processes, which in turn implies that, for every t
and every j 6= i, kˆ(j, t) ≤ k(j, t), as needed.
Proof of Lemma 4 (Outside Option Lemma). Fix a learning draw such that τ oo(α) is finite; that
is, strategy α leads to the outside option being chosen. For each item i, let κi = min{κ : piiκ ≤ pi}
be the number of steps needed for the learning process pii to reach the threshold pi. Since α
stops with the choice of the outside option once all beliefs reach their respective lower thresholds,
τ oo(α) =
∑
i κ
i, which is independent of α.
Proof of Proposition 2. Let φ˜i
(
pit+1 | pit
)
denote the ex ante Markov transition probabilities of the
DM’s belief about item i when she focuses on i in period t. Consider the following bandit problem.
In each period t = 0, 1, . . ., the DM chooses an item ιt ∈ I and pays a flow cost
γ (pιtt , ιt) =

c (pιtt , ιt) if p
ιt < pιtt < p
ιt ,
0 if pιtt ≥ pιt ,
c otherwise.
Interpret pit as the state of item i. In each period t, the item ιt chosen by the DM transitions
to a new state pιtt+1 according to the Markov process φ˜
i, and the states of all other items remain
unaltered; that is, pjt+1 = p
j
t for j 6= ιt. The bandit problem is to choose a non-wasteful strategy α
to minimize
Γ(α) = E
∞∑
t=0
δtγ (pιtt , ιt) . (11)
This problem differs from the original problem in that the flow cost from focusing on item i in period
t depends only on pit and is independent of p
j
t for j 6= i. The flow payoffs in the original problem are
interdependent in that whether the DM stops upon reaching pit ≤ pi depends on whether pjt ≤ pj for
all other items j 6= i. This difference allows us to apply the following standard textbook result from
the theory of multi-armed bandits (see e.g. Weber (1992) or Whittle (1980)): an optimal solution
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to the bandit problem (11) is a Gittins index strategy where the index for an item depends only
on the current belief. In particular, when ties for the highest Gittins index are broken by uniform
randomization, this describes an optimal strategy that satisfies IIA and stationarity.
It remains to connect the bandit problem (11) to the original problem (2). Note that any
solution to the bandit problem (i) always chooses an item i such that pit ≥ p if such an item exists,
and (ii) always chooses an item i such that pit > p if such an item exists and no item satisfying
condition (i) exists.
Note that Γ(α) = C(α) + cE
∑∞
t=1 1t≥τoo(α), where the expectation is with respect to τ
oo(α).
By the Outside Option Lemma, τ oo(α) is identical for all α satisfying (i) and (ii). Therefore, there
exists a constant Kδ such that
Γ(α) = C(α) +Kδ. (12)
Therefore, a non-wasteful strategy α solves the auxiliary bandit problem if and only if it solves the
original problem, as needed.
A.2 Proofs for Section 4
Proof of Proposition 3. This proof makes use of coupling. We again construct a common probabil-
ity space on which we can compare the processes of beliefs pt(α) and pt(α
∗), where, by construction,
the beliefs under strategy α follow the law P eaα while those under α
∗ follow P eaα∗ . However, the par-
ticular construction differs from that in the proof of Theorem 1.
Let Π = {p[+], p[+][+], . . . , p[−][−], p[−]}, which is the set of transient beliefs that the DM may
attain for either item. For each pi ∈ Π and κ = 0, 1, . . ., let `(pi, κ) be an i.i.d. random variable that
attains values pi[+] and pi[−] with probabilities pi−pi[−]pi[+]−pi[−] and pi[+]−pipi[+]−pi[−] , respectively. An updating
draw is a collection (`(pi, κ))pi,κ of realizations of `(pi, κ), one for each pair (pi, κ) ∈ Π× N.
We interpret `(pi, κ) as the updated belief of a DM who learns for one period about an item
i starting at the belief pi = pi where κ is a counter indicating the total number of times the DM
has focused on an item with associated belief pi. We now construct, for each fixed updating draw
and any attention strategy γ, the process of beliefs pt(γ). In this construction, we use an auxiliary
counter kt(γ) that takes values in N|Π|. Define the joint process of pt(γ) and kt(γ) as follows.
Let kpi0 (γ) = 0 for all pi and p0(γ) = p0. In each period t, the focus of attention ιt in t is chosen
according to the attention strategy γ(pt, t). Recursively define
kpit+1(γ) =
kpit (γ) + 1 if pi = p
ιt
t ,
kpit (γ) otherwise
and
pjt+1(γ) =
`
(
pi, k
pjt (γ)
t (γ)
)
if j = ιt,
pjt (γ) otherwise.
By construction, for each strategy γ, the beliefs pt(γ) follow the law P
ea
γ .
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For each transient belief pi ∈ Π, we introduce the belief process at(pi) that would result from
learning about a single item starting from the prior belief pi, making use of a counter hp˜it . Formally,
let a0(pi) = pi, h
p˜i
0 = 0 for all p˜i ∈ Π, and recursively define at+1(pi) = `
(
at(pi), h
at(pi)
t
)
, and, for each
p˜i ∈ Π,
hp˜it+1 =
hp˜it + 1 if p˜i = at(pi),hp˜it otherwise.
For each strategy γ, let Mt(γ) = maxi=1,2 p
i
t(γ), M t(γ) = maxs=0,...,tMs(γ), and M t(γ) =
mins=0,...,tMs(γ). The strategy γ stops by period t, i.e., τ
ea(γ) ≤ t, if
p = M t(γ) or M t(γ) = p.
We will prove that, for every prior, in each updating draw, if a strategy α stops by t, then the
strategy α∗ also stops by t. We proceed by induction on t. To see that the statement holds for
t = 1, note that if p10 6= p20, then M0(α) = M0(α∗) = max{p10, p20} and M1(α∗) = a1
(
max{p10, p20}
)
while M1(α) equals a1
(
max{p10, p20}
)
or max{p10, p20}. (The latter case arises when α focuses on the
item with the lower belief in period 0.) Thus
M1(α
∗) ≤M1(α) ≤M1(α) ≤M1(α∗),
as needed.
Suppose the statement holds for t−1. If a strategy α stops by period t then, since the induction
hypothesis applies regardless of the prior, the strategy α˜ stops by t, where α˜(p, 0) = α(p, 0) and
α˜(p, t) = α∗(p) for t > 0. Therefore, to close the induction step, it suffices to prove that if α˜ stops
by t then α∗ stops by t. This is immediate if p10 = p20. Accordingly, suppose that p10 6= p20 and,
without loss of generality, take p10 < p
2
0. If α˜ focuses on item 2 in period 0, then the belief processes
are the same under α˜ and α∗. Thus it suffices to show that if β = β[α∗, 1, 1] stops by t then α∗
stops by t.12
To prove the last implication, we distinguish two sets of updating draws. The first set consists
of those for which as(p
2
0) > p
1
0 in every period s = 0, 1, . . . , t − 1. For any (ordered) belief pair
p = (p1, p2), write 〈p〉 for the unordered pair {p1, p2}. (By considering the unordered pairs of beliefs
we eliminate the need to keep track of which item has the higher belief and which is randomly chosen
at a tie.) For each updating draw in this first set, for each s = 1, 2, . . . , t,
〈ps(α∗)〉 =
{
p10, as
(
p20
)}
and Ms(α
∗) = as
(
p20
)
,
and
〈ps(β)〉 =
{
a1
(
p10
)
, as−1
(
p20
)}
and Ms(β) = as−1
(
p20
)
12Recall that β[α∗, 1, 1] is the strategy constructed from α∗ by forcing the DM to focus on item 1 at t = 0 and
follow α∗ for every t > 0.
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since as(p
2
0) > p
1
0 and as(p
2
0) ≥ a1(p10) for all s = 1, 2, . . . , t − 1. Therefore, α∗ updates the belief
as(p
2
0) in all periods s = 0, . . . , t, and β updates the belief as−1(p20) in all periods s = 1, . . . , t. Thus,
for each updating draw in this first set,
M t(α
∗) ≤M t(β) ≤M t(β) ≤M t(α∗),
and the induction step holds.
The second set of updating draws consists of those for which there exists a period s ∈ {1, 2, . . . , t−
1} in which as(p20) = p10. (Note that the second set is complementary to the first set.) Let s∗ be
the minimal such period. For each draw in this second set, we have
〈ps∗+1(α∗)〉 =
{
p10, a1(p
1
0)
}
since 〈ps∗(α∗)〉 =
{
p10, p
1
0
}
and the belief p10 is updated once by s
∗. We also have
〈ps∗+1(β)〉 =
{
a1(p
1
0), as∗(p
2
0)
}
since the belief p10 is updated once in period 0 and in each period s = 1, . . . , s
∗, 〈ps(β)〉 ={
a1(p
1
0), as−1(p20)
}
and as−1(p20) ≥ a1(p10). Thus the strategy β updates the belief as−1(p20) in
all periods s = 1, . . . , s∗. Since as∗(p20) = p10, we have
〈ps∗+1(β)〉 =
{
a1(p
1
0), p
1
0
}
= 〈ps∗+1(α∗)〉 .
Therefore, in each updating draw from the second set, 〈ps(α∗)〉 = 〈ps(β)〉 for all s ≥ s∗ + 1. In
particular, α∗ and β stop in the same period, concluding the proof of the induction step.
Proof of Proposition 4. The proof is similar to that of Proposition 3. The coupling construction
exploits the symmetry with respect to belief 1/2 as follows. Let
Π = {p[+], p[+][+], . . . , p[−][−], p[−]} ∩ [1/2, 1)
and
Π = {p[+], p[+][+], . . . , p[−][−], p[−]} ∩ (0, 1/2).
An updating draw is a collection (`(pi, κ))(pi,κ)∈Π×N, where `(pi, κ) is an i.i.d. random variable that
attains values pi[+] and pi[−] with probabilities pi−pi[−]pi[+]−pi[−] and pi[+]−pipi[+]−pi[−] , respectively.
For any attention strategy γ, we construct the process of beliefs pt(γ) in each updating draw
as follows. Let kpi0 (γ) = 0 for all pi ∈ Π and p0(γ) = p0. In each period t, the focus of attention ιt
in t is chosen according to γ(pt, t). We distinguish two cases: p
ιt ≥ 1/2 and pιt < 1/2. If pιtt ≥ 1/2,
then
kpit+1(γ) =
kpit (γ) + 1 if pi = p
ιt
t ,
kpit (γ) if pi ∈ Π \ {pιtt }.
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and
pjt+1(γ) =
`
(
pjt (γ), k
pjt (γ)
t (γ)
)
if j = ιt,
pjt (γ) otherwise.
If pιtt < 1/2, then
kpit+1(γ) =
kpit (γ) + 1 if pi = 1− p
ιt
t ,
kpit (γ) if pi ∈ Π \ {1− pιtt },
and
pjt+1(γ) =
1− `
(
1− pjt (γ), k1−p
j
t (γ)
t (γ)
)
if j = ιt,
pjt (γ) otherwise.
By construction, for each strategy γ, the beliefs pt(γ) follow the law P
ea
γ .
We again define a belief process that would result from learning about a single item. For any
belief pi ∈ Π ∪ Π, let pˆi = max{pi, 1− pi}. Define the belief process at(pi) as follows: a0(pi) = pˆi and
hp˜i0 = 0 for all p˜i ∈ Π, and for t > 0, recursively define
at+1(pi) = max
{
`
(
at(pi), h
at(pi)
t
)
, 1− `
(
at(pi), h
at(pi)
t
)}
and, for each p˜i ∈ Π,
hp˜it+1 =
hp˜it + 1 if p˜i = at(pi),hp˜it otherwise.
For any attention strategy γ, let Mt(γ) = maxi=1,2 pˆ
i
t(γ) and M t(γ) = maxs=0,...,tMs(γ). The
strategy γ stops by period t, i.e., τ eano(γ) ≤ t, if M t(γ) = p. We will prove by induction on t that,
for every prior, in each updating draw, if a strategy α stops by t, then the strategy α∗∗ also stops
by t.
To see that the statement holds for t = 1, note that if p10 6= p20, then M0(α) = M0(α∗∗) =
max
{
pˆ10, pˆ
2
0
}
andM1(α
∗∗) = a1
(
max
{
pˆ10, pˆ
2
0
})
whileM1(α) equals a1
(
max
{
pˆ10, pˆ
2
0
})
or max
{
pˆ10, pˆ
2
0
}
.
(The latter case arises when α focuses on the less certain item in period 0.) Thus
M1(α) ≤M1(α∗∗),
as needed.
Suppose the statement holds for t−1. If α stops by t then, since the induction hypothesis holds
for every prior, strategy α˜ also stops by t, where α˜(p, 0) = α(p, 0) and α˜(p, t) = α∗∗(p) for t > 0.
Therefore, to close the induction step, it suffices to prove that if α˜ stops by t then α∗∗ stops by
t. This is immediate if pˆ10 = pˆ
2
0 since then the two belief processes coincide. Accordingly, suppose
that p10 6= p20 and, without loss of generality, take pˆ10 < pˆ20. If α˜ focuses on item 2 in period 0 then
the belief processes coincide under α˜ and α∗∗. Thus it suffices to show that if β = β[α∗∗, 1, 1] stops
by t then α∗∗ stops by t.
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To prove the last implication, we distinguish two sets of updating draws. The first set consists
of those for which as(pˆ
2
0) > pˆ
1
0 in every period s = 0, 1, . . . , t− 1. For each draw in this first set and
each s = 1, 2, . . . , t,
{
pˆ1s(α
∗∗), pˆ2s(α
∗∗)
}
=
{
pˆ10, as
(
p20
)}
and Ms(α
∗∗) = as
(
p20
)
,
and {
pˆ1s(β), pˆ
2
s(β)
}
=
{
a1
(
p10
)
, as−1
(
p20
)}
and Ms(β) = as−1
(
p20
)
since as(p
2
0) > pˆ
1
0 and as(p
2
0) ≥ a1(p10) for all s = 1, 2, . . . , t − 1. Therefore, α∗∗ updates as(p20) in
all periods s = 0, . . . , t, and β updates as−1(p20) in all periods s = 1, . . . , t. Thus, for each updating
draw in this first set,
M t(β) ≤M t(α∗∗),
and the induction step holds.
The second set of updating draws consists of those for which there exists a period s ∈ {1, 2, . . . , t−
1} in which as(p20) = pˆ10. (Note that the second set is complementary to the first.) Let s∗ be the
minimal such period and observe that
{
pˆ1s∗+1(α
∗∗), pˆ2s∗+1(α
∗∗)
}
=
{
pˆ10, a1(pˆ
1
0)
}
since
{
pˆ1s∗(α
∗∗), pˆ2s∗(α∗∗)
}
=
{
pˆ10, pˆ
1
0
}
and the belief with value pˆ10 or 1− pˆ10 is updated once by s∗.
Also, {
pˆ1s∗+1(β), pˆ
2
s∗+1(β)
}
=
{
a1(p
1
0), as∗(p
2
0)
}
since the belief p10 is updated once in period 0 and, for each period s = 1, . . . , s
∗,
{
pˆ1s(β), pˆ
2
s(β)
}
={
a1(p
1
0), as−1(p20)
}
and as−1(p20) ≥ a1(p10). Since as∗(p20) = pˆ10, we have{
pˆ1s∗+1(β), pˆ
2
s∗+1(β)
}
=
{
a1(p
1
0), pˆ
1
0
}
=
{
pˆ1s∗+1(α
∗∗), pˆ2s∗+1(α
∗∗)
}
.
Therefore, in each updating draw from the second set,
{
pˆ1s(β), pˆ
2
s(β)
}
=
{
pˆ1s(α
∗∗), pˆ2s(α∗∗)
}
for all
s ≥ s∗+ 1. In particular, α∗∗ and β stop in the same period, concluding the proof of the induction
step.
A.3 Proof of Theorem 2
As in the proof of Theorem 1, for any variable η in the baseline process, let ηˆ denote its counterpart
in the manipulated process. We construct the probability space and the baseline and manipulated
processes (pt, ιt)t as in the proof of Theorem 1. Note that Lemmata 1, 2, and 3 extend verbatim
to the current setting.
Given any draw, let I∗ denote the set of items deemed optimal in the baseline process and Iˆ∗
the corresponding set in the manipulated process.
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Lemma 6 (Choice Lemma for Multiple Values). Let i be the target item. For any draw,
1. if i ∈ I∗, then (i) i ∈ Iˆ∗, (ii) Iˆ∗ ⊆ I∗, and (iii) τˆ ≤ τ .
2. for any j 6= i, if j ∈ Iˆ∗, (i) j ∈ I∗, (ii) I∗ ⊆ Iˆ∗, and (iii) τ ≤ τˆ .
Proof. Statement 1 : Consider any draw in which the baseline process deems the target item i
optimal (i.e., i ∈ I∗) with stopping time τ . First suppose τˆ ≥ τ . By the attention lemma,
kˆ(i, τ) ≥ k(i, τ). Since α deems i optimal and stops at τ , the DM is sufficiently certain of i’s
value at τ . Hence, by non-wastefulness I, kˆ(i, τ) = k(i, τ), and the two processes meet at τ . Thus
Iˆ∗ = I∗, τˆ = τ , and (i–iii) hold.
Now consider any draw in which τˆ < τ . We first show that, under the manipulated process,
the DM does not deem any item j 6= i optimal. Suppose for contradiction that j ∈ Iˆ∗. Then there
exists v such that pˆjτˆ ∈ Cj(v) and for all j′ 6= j, we have pˆj
′
τˆ ∈ Cj
′
(v) or pˆj
′
τˆ ∈ Lj
′
(v). By the
Attention Lemma, k(j′′, τˆ) ≥ kˆ(j′′, τˆ) for all j′′ 6= i. By the Coupling Lemma, there exists a period
t ≤ τˆ such p−it = pˆ−iτˆ and k(−i, t) = kˆ(−i, τˆ). Non-wastefulness I and II imply that the baseline
strategy does not focus on items j′′ 6= i in periods s > t, and thus k(−i, τˆ) = k(−i, t) = kˆ(−i, τˆ).
Therefore, the baseline and manipulated processes meet at τˆ . By the Meeting Lemma, pτˆ = pˆτˆ ,
which implies that τ ≤ τˆ , contradicting the assumption that τˆ < τ . Therefore, if the manipulated
process stops at τˆ < τ , then Iˆ∗ = {i} and properties (i–iii) again hold.
Statement 2 : Consider any draw in which the manipulated process deems an item j 6= i
optimal (i.e., j ∈ Iˆ∗) with stopping time τˆ . First suppose τ ≥ τˆ . By the Attention Lemma,
k(−i, τˆ) ≥ kˆ(−i, τˆ). By the Coupling Lemma, there exists t ≤ τˆ such that k(−i, t) = kˆ(−i, τˆ) and
p−it = p
−i
τˆ . Since, under the manipulated strategy, the process stops at τˆ and the DM deems j
optimal, it must be that for some v, pjτˆ ∈ Cj(v) and for each j′ 6= j, pj
′
τˆ ∈ Cj
′
or pj
′
τˆ ∈ Lj
′
(v). Thus,
by non-wastefulness I and II, the baseline strategy focuses only on item i in each period s ≥ t, and
hence k(−i, τˆ) = k(−i, t) = kˆ(−i, τˆ). Therefore, the two processes meet at τˆ , Iˆ∗ = I∗, τˆ = τ , and
(i–iii) hold.
Now consider any draw in which τ < τˆ . We first show that, under the baseline process, the
DM does not deem item i optimal. Suppose for contradiction that i ∈ I∗. Then, under the
baseline process, in period τ the DM is sufficiently certain of the value of i. By the Attention
Lemma, kˆ(i, τ) ≥ k(i, τ). Non-wastefulness I implies that kˆ(i, τ) = k(i, τ). Therefore, the two
processes meet at τ . By the Meeting Lemma, pτ = pˆτ , which implies that τˆ ≤ τ , contradicting the
assumption that τ < τˆ . Therefore, if the baseline process stops at τ < τˆ , then i /∈ I∗.
Next, observe that k(−i, τ) = kˆ(−i, τˆ). Otherwise, one of the two processes γ ∈ {α, β} focuses
on items other than i in fewer periods by τ(γ) than the other process γ′ does by τ(γ′); that is,
k(−i, τ(γ′), γ′) > k(−i, τ(γ), γ). By the Coupling Lemma, there exists a period t such that the
process γ′ does not stop by t, k(−i, t; γ′) = k(−i, τ(γ); γ) and p−it (γ′) = p−iτ(γ)(γ). Since γ stops
at τ(γ) and the DM deems j 6= i optimal, it must be that, for some v, pjτ(γ) ∈ Cj(v) and for each
item j′ 6= i, either pj′τ(γ) ∈ Cj
′
or pj
′
τ(γ) ∈ Lj
′
(v). Therefore, non-wastefulness I and II imply that
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the strategy γ′ focuses only on item i in each period s > t. Hence k(−i, τ(γ′), γ′) = k(−i, t; γ′) =
kˆ(−i, τ(γ), γ).
Therefore, p−iτ = pˆ
−i
τˆ . Since i is not the unique optimal item under either process, there exists
some v and a nonempty set I−i,∗ ⊆ I \ {i} such that pjτ = pˆjτˆ ∈ Cj(v) for each j ∈ I−i,∗, and
pjτ = pˆ
j
τˆ ∈ Lj(v) for each j 6= i such that j /∈ I−i,∗. Since the DM does not deem i optimal under the
baseline process, piτ ∈ Li(v) and I∗ = I−i,∗. The DM may deem i optimal under the manipulated
process, and hence either Iˆ∗ = I−i,∗ or Iˆ∗ = I−i,∗∪{i}. Therefore, either Iˆ∗ = I∗ or Iˆ∗ = I∗∪{i},
and properties (i-iii) hold.
For (7) and (8), observe that optimality and monotonicity of σ and statements 1 and 2 of
Lemma 6 imply, respectively, that σ(i, Iˆ∗) ≥ σ(i, I∗) and σ(j, Iˆ∗) ≤ σ(j, I∗) in each draw. For
(9) and (10), let hj(t) = 1τ≤tσ(j, I∗) and hˆj(t) = 1τˆ≤tσ(j, Iˆ∗). Statement 1 of Lemma 6 implies
that hi(t) ≤ hˆi(t) for the target item i and any period t. Statement 2 of the lemma implies that
hj(t) ≥ hˆj(t) for all items j 6= i and any period t. Taking expectations across draws yields the
result.
A.4 Computation of the ex ante demand from Example 4.1
We characterize Diea for i = 1; the case for i = 2 is symmetric. The following computation shows
that
D1ea(p;α
∗) =

p−p1
2(p−p2)
(
1− (p−p2)2
(p−p)2
)
+ p
1−p2
p−p2 if p
1 ≥ p2,
p−p2
2(p−p1)
(
1− (p−p1)2
(p−p)2
)
if p1 ≤ p2.
(13)
If p10 = p
2
0 = p, then α
∗ stops with beliefs (p1τ , p2τ ) = (p, p) (and hence the outside option is
chosen) with probability
(
p−p
p−p
)2
. By symmetry, conditional on not choosing the outside option,
the DM chooses item 1 with probability 1/2. Thus
D1ea(p, p;α
∗) =
1
2
(
1−
(
p− p
p− p
)2)
.
Now consider prior beliefs such that p10 > p
2
0. The strategy α
∗ initially focuses on item 1 until
p1t = p or p
1
t = p
2
0. In the former case, which occurs with probability
p10−p20
p−p20
, the DM chooses item
1. In the latter case, which occurs with probability
p−p10
p−p20
, the DM chooses item 1 with probability
D1ea(p
2
0, p
2
0;α
∗). Therefore, for p1 > p2,
D1ea(p
1, p2;α∗) =
p1 − p2
p− p2 +
p− p1
p− p2D
1
ea(p
2, p2;α∗),
in agreement with (13).
Finally, consider prior beliefs such that p10 < p
2
0. The strategy α
∗ initially focuses on item 2
until p2t = p or p
2
t = p
1
0. In the former case, the DM chooses item 2. In the latter case, which occurs
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with probability
p−p20
p−p10
, the DM chooses item 1 with probability D1ea(p
1
0, p
1
0;α
∗). Thus, for p1 < p2
we have
D1ea(p
1, p2;α∗) =
p− p2
p− p1D
1
ea(p
1, p1;α∗), (14)
as needed.
A.5 Computation of the ex ante demand from Example 4.2
We characterizeDino for i = 1; the case of i = 2 is symmetric. By symmetry of α
∗∗, D1no(p1, p2;α∗∗) =
D2no(p
2, p1;α∗∗) = 1−D1no(p2, p1;α∗∗), and thus it suffices to compute D1no(p1, p2;α∗∗) for p1 ≥ p2
only. Demand D1no for this set of beliefs is characterized in (15)—(18) below.
Consider beliefs on the two main diagonals. First, symmetry implies that D1no(p, p;α
∗∗) = 1/2
whenever p < p < p. Second, consider prior beliefs of the form (p10, p
2
0) = (p, 1 − p), where
1/2 < p < p. Starting from such a prior, if the strategy α∗∗ never leads to beliefs (1/2, 1/2), then
it stops either with p2τ = p or with p
1
τ = p; in either case, the DM chooses item 1. If α
∗∗ does lead
to beliefs (1/2, 1/2), then the DM chooses item 1 with probability 1/2. Therefore, if 1/2 < p < p,
D1no(p, 1− p;α∗∗) = 1− x+ x/2 where x is the probability that the DM’s beliefs reach (1/2, 1/2).
The value of x may be computed as follows. Consider the event that pi1κ stops at p and pi
2
κ stops
at p. The ex ante probability of this event is
p− p
p− p
1− p− p
p− p =
(
p− p
p− p
)2
,
where the equality follows from p = 1− p. Since this event can occur only if the DM’s beliefs reach
(1/2, 1/2), in which case it occurs with probability 1/4, we have(
p− p
p− p
)2
=
x
4
and
D1no(p, 1− p;α∗∗) = 1− 2
(
p− p
p− p
)2
whenever 1/2 < p < p.
Now consider beliefs in the set {p : p1 ≥ p2}. We partition this set into four disjoint subsets:
1. For {p : p1 ∈ (p, 1/2], p2 ∈ (p, p1]}, α∗∗ initially focuses on item 2 until p2t reaches p or p1.
Thus, for p in this subset,
D1no(p;α
∗∗) =
p1 − p2
p1 − p +
p2 − p
p1 − pD
1
no(p
1, p1;α∗∗) =
p1 − p2/2− p/2
p1 − p . (15)
2. For {p : p1 ∈ (1/2, p], p2 ∈ (p, 1 − p1]}, α∗∗ initially focuses on item 2 until p2t reaches p or
34
1− p1. Thus, for p in this subset,
D1no(p;α
∗∗) =
1− p1 − p2
1− p1 − p +
p2 − p
1− p1 − pD
1
no(p
1, 1− p1;α∗∗) = 1− 2(p− p
1)(p2 − p)
(p− p)2 . (16)
3. For {p : p1 ∈ (1/2, p], p2 ∈ (1−p1, 1/2]}, α∗∗ initially focuses on item 1 until p1t reaches 1−p2
or p. Thus, for p in this subset,
D1no(p;α
∗∗) =
p1 − 1 + p2
p− 1 + p2 +
p− p1
p− 1 + p2D
1
no(1− p2, p2;α∗∗) = 1− 2
(p− p1)(p2 − p)
(p− p)2 . (17)
4. For {p : p1 ∈ (1/2, p], p2 ∈ (1/2, p1]}, α∗∗ initially focuses on item 1 until p1t reaches p2 or p.
Thus, for p in this subset,
D1no(p;α
∗∗) =
p1 − p2
p− p2 +
p− p1
p− p2D
1
no(p
2, p2;α∗∗) =
p1/2 + p/2− p2
p− p2 . (18)
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